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Review Essay

Still, at the Margins

Emily M.S. Houh

Austin Sarat, ed., The Social Organizationof Law: Introductory Readings.
Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Co., 2004. 596 pp. $65.95 paper.

In

one of many traditions of critical race scholarship, this review

opens with a first-person narrative. When I was asked to review
Austin Sarat's new compilation of introductory readings on law and
society at the "Change" breakfast of the 2004 annual Law and
Society Association meeting in Chicago, I responded affirmatively
but with rather tepid enthusiasm, which reflected-as I recall-the
level of enthusiasm I felt for the conference overall, despite (or
perhaps because of) it being my third year in attendance at the
notoriously large and panel-packed meeting. When I was asked
further to review the compilation specifically from a "critical race
perspective," my lack of enthusiasm quickly transformed to discomfort, and I wanted to immediately revoke my acceptance of the
offer to do the review.
Even those who do not identify as "race crits" or "fern race
crits"-as I do-are likely aware that law and society is known in
certain academic circles for being overwhelmingly liberal (and,
therefore, not critical) and overwhelmingly white. Moreover, although certainly many race crits do consider themselves part of this
large, scholarly community and while I always enjoyed participating in and attending various panels, up to that point I had never
sought to make law and society my intellectual "home." As a result,
in being asked to review Sarat's new book, I felt both flattered and
doomed-flattered because I was being called upon for my "expertise" as a race crit who could write intelligently about the book,
and doomed because I was an outsider being invited in, however
briefly, to criticize a principal player-an insider's insider-in the
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law and society movement. It was a classic micro-dilemma of "subject unrest" (Culp et al. 2003:2435)-I wanted in and wanted out
at the same time, for all the right and wrong reasons. In the moments when I contemplated changing my mind, my tendency toward melodrama gave way to my inability to say no and, more
seriously, to my feeling that someone should write a critical race
review of the book. But my feelings of ambivalence toward this
review, even as I write it, have not diminished, and I am all too
aware of my positionality as an outsider to the law and society
community. This disclosure of outsider positionality is an important one because it frames the substantive critique of this review.

Mission and Audience
The Social Organization of Law is aimed at students, both at undergraduate students who are interested in becoming lawyers or in
the legal system more generally, and at law students interested in
the interconnectedness of law and society. In his introduction, Sarat sets forth the text's basic premise, that "law seeks to work in the
world" (p. 1), and he describes the two ways in which the collection
aims to explain how law does so:
First, the readings in this book highlight law's responsiveness to
various dimensions of social stratification. They draw attention
to the question of when, why, and how legal decisions respond to
social characteristics (e.g., race, class, gender) of those making the
decisions as well as those who are subject to them and when, why,
and how they should do so. ...
Second, the book treats law itself as a social organization, emphasizing the complex relations among its various component
parts (e.g., judges and jurors, police and prosecutors, appellate
and trial courts). . . . (p. 1).
Sarat thematically organizes his anthology around the law's paradoxes. That is, the law works to be "impartial and evenhanded"
but also "sympathetic and responsive"; accessible and efficient but
not overly so; deterrent of socially unacceptable behaviors but also
equitable toward the perpetrators of such conduct; and, most significantly, controlling of violence and also of the sort of discretion
thought necessary to control that violence (p. 3). Sarat's stated
premises and goals are crucial and promising, but whether he
makes a compelling case in his execution-from a critical race
perspective-is a different matter that is addressed throughout this
review.
In terms of achieving its stated goals, and to the extent that
those goals are circumscribed by inattention to the critical voice,
the anthology is a success. It is broadly broken into five parts,
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respectively: "When Law Fails," "The Search for Law," "Access to
Justice: The Demand for Law and Law's Demands," "Whose Law
Is It Anyway?" "Severity and Leniency: Administering a System of
Discretionary Justice," and "Organizing Law's Violence." Within
each part, the readings are further organized under sections. For
example, "When Law Fails" is subdivided into sections on "The
Limits of Legal Protection" and "What Law Is For." Sarat's selections cover a broad array of law and society topics that fit easily
together and within their topical categories and subcategories.
Moreover, the structure of the book makes obvious sense in light
of its stated goals. For example, Sarat provides a good basic foundation of Western liberal legal thought throughout by his inclusion
of pieces of works by the likes of Thomas Hobbes and John Stuart
Mill. Sarat also provides a solid foundation to the extent that he
excerpts works by so many of the leading lights of the law and
society movement. But in a sense, this "success" is precisely what is
most troubling, from a critical race perspective, about this anthology.
The book fails to incorporate a critical race or feminist perspective
into its stated goals. This is especially problematic given that one of
the major organizing themes of the anthology is violence.

Violence as Theme
Cover's brilliant and classic essay, "Violence and the Word"
(Cover 1986), appears toward the beginning of Sarat's anthology,
in a subsection called "Dispensing and Controlling Violence" (pp.
83-93). Though not technically a member of the critical legal
studies camp, Cover was a legal historian and constitutional and
procedural law scholar who was widely regarded and respected for
his commitments as a teacher, scholar, and activist regarding social
justice issues. In his introduction to Cover's essay, Sarat calls attention to how the structure of the law works to do violence, particularly in the contexts of policing and criminal punishment, when
individuals are most directly subject to the control and discretion of
the state (p. 84). This is, for me, one of his most important goals.
This should come as no surprise, since critical race theory may be
defined in part by its concentrated analyses of the ways in which
the law and those who interpret it have done and continue to do
violence on and to bodies of color (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado
1995; Valdes et al. 2002).l Thus, considering Sarat's commitment
1 The

three critical race anthologies referenced here are of particular importance

because each of them was compiled and edited by some of the founders of and key contributors to critical race scholarship. Each anthology includes diverse readings on topics
ranging from, for example, the inadequacies of civil rights law to race and postmodernism
to coalition-building and critical race praxis. Significantly, the readings included in each
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to exploring the theme of legal violence, I was surprised by the
book's basic failure to include more accounts by or about people of
color and women of color, who have historically borne the brunt of
this legal violence, and again by its failure to include any writings of
critical race scholars and critical race feminists, most of whom have
committed their academic careers to writing about such violence.
In fact, the inclusion of Cover's essay within Sarat's larger
project is somewhat ironic, for in it, Cover wrote very specifically
about "legal interpretation as practical activity" (p. 86) and "legal
interpretation as bonded interpretation" (p. 87). As to the former,
Cover wrote, "The judicial word is a mandate for the deeds of
others. ... Thus, ... [legal] interpretations ... are not only 'practical,' they are, themselves practices" (p. 86). As to the latter, Cover
wrote:
Legal interpretation ... can never be "free"; it can never be the
function of an understanding of the text or word alone. Nor can it
be a simple function of what the interpreter perceives to be
merely a reading of the "social text," a reading of all relevant
social data. Legal interpretation must be capable of transforming
itself into action...
In order to maintain these critical links to effective violent behavior, legal interpretation must reflexively consider its own social organization. ... [L]egal interpretation is a form of bonded
interpretation, bound at once to practical application (to the
deeds it implies) and to the ecology of jurisdictional roles (the
conditions of effective domination). The bonds are reciprocal....
(p. 87).
While I do not wish to characterize a purely academic controversy
as the type of interpretive violence with which Cover was primarily
and passionately concerned, his discussions of interpretation as
practical activity and bonded interpretation have some application
here, albeit on an uber-micro level. For the act of assembling (an
introductory) canon in the influential field of law and society is an
act of legal interpretation. The institutional context in and through
which this interpretation occurs also renders the act a discursive
practice. What, then, is the institutional context here? And has
Sarat, as the legal interpreter, engaged in the sort of bonded interpretation that has transformed itself into action? Moreover, what
action is called for?
Although I have over the past few years heard about and observed tensions between the law and society and critical race theory
movements, I am not equipped, as an outsider to the law and
anthology demonstrate the many and proliferating ways in which law and legal discourse
have "violently" constructed (both literally and figuratively) race and racial categories in
service to the systemic maintenance of white supremacy.
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society community, to respond intelligently to the first question of
institutional context. Rather than offering my own observations
and intuitions about these two movements (and I have certainly
noted them), I present a few relevant questions instead: How are
law and society "insiders" and critical race "insiders" positioned
within their own institutions-do they occupy roles of power in
their institutions, or are they marginalized within them? Are their
institutions big players in the national academic game? What is the
ideological range of those who write in the law and society tradition
and of those who write in the race crit tradition? Are law and
society insiders and race crit insiders openly politically active, either
in a local or global sense? If so, are they active in an organized,
collective sense or, rather, as individuals? As a matter of internal
programming and "quality control," do they engage in self-analysis
and, if so, to what extent? Addressing contextual questions such as
these within the introductory text would have given this compilation more of the reflexivity that Cover sought.
I set forth these questions not only because I think they speak
in different ways to the moral commitments, as Cover called them,
that drive our own legal interpretive acts and practices, but also
because how one responds to them also helps answer the questions
of whether one's acts of "bonded interpretation" are translatable
into action and what action is called for. In a portion of Cover's
essay that does not appear in Sarat's edited volume, Cover wrote:
"At its best [legal interpretation] seeks to 'impose meaning on the
institution ...and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning.' There is, however a persistent chasm between thought and
action. It is one thing to understand what ought to be done, quite
another thing to do it" (1986:1610-1). What meaning has Sarat
imposed on the "institution" of law and society in constructing and
interpreting its introductory canon? What restructuring is required? And how do we bridge the chasm between thought and
action? I engage in my own legal interpretive practice in the next
section as I attempt to answer these questions from a critical race
perspective.

Who's In and Who's Out
What disappoints me most about Sarat's selection of materials is
not merely the absence of critical and/or minority (and not necessarily critical) voices, but the glaringness of that absence. In Cover's terms, the act of omission of those voices exemplifies the
"persistent chasm between thought and action" within our liberal
institutions and organizations. Again speaking in Cover's terms, it is
"one thing to understand what ought to be done [incorporate
HeinOnline -- 40 Law & Soc'y Rev. 485 2006
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critical race voices (and beyond that, voices of scholars of color) into
the law and society canon], quite another thing to do it." Concretely and as a matter of bean-counting, out of the 65 selections in
the book, I could identify with any certainty only one selection
authored by a person of color; that selection is an excerpt of a law
review article by Harold Hongju Koh, currently Dean and Gerard
C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith, Professor of International Law at
the Yale Law School, titled "The Spirit of the Laws" (pp. 29-36;
Koh 2002). And while Koh is one of the world's foremost scholars
of international law, it is doubtful that he would identify as a critical
race scholar (Koh 1991, 1994, 2001, 2002; Koh & Slye 1999).2 In
fact, based on my assessment, nothing appears in this anthology
that could be identified as critical race scholarship (let alone feminist critical race scholarship).
This is not to say that race is not treated at all in the text. After
all, a book that purports to be about the social organization of law
could not be taken seriously without a discussion of issues related to
race, class, and gender. In the Notes and Questions following each
selection, Sarat frequently asks about the relevance of race to the
social organization of law. Following a piece by Fletcher on the
infamous Bernhard Goetz shooting on a New York City subway
(pp. 18-26; Fletcher 1988), for example, Sarat states, "The Goetz
case highlights the role of race in organizing perceptions of difference and danger. Should law pay attention to race? If so, when and
why? If not, why not?" (p. 26). Similarly, following an excerpt from
Turk's "Law as a Weapon in Social Conflict" (pp. 43-7; Turk 2004),
Sarat asks, "How do you suppose your social position (your race,
class, gender) affects how you perceive the law?" (p. 48). Questions
about the mantra-like trilogy of "race, class, and gender" as social
positionality appear repeatedly in Sarat's Notes and Questions (for
example, pp. 1, 103, 317). But does the anthology equip its student
audience to adequately and thoughtfully respond to those questions?
Regrettably, the answer is a resounding no, despite the fact that
a few of the selections speak squarely to issues concerning race. I
take a moment to discuss these selections, several of which are
commendable, but I then move on to discuss other selections that
might have been included to represent the truly critical perspective
that the volume is lacking. Chapter 29, which appears in the section
entitled "Who Speaks and Who Is Heard: The Continuing Significance of Class"-a section that should have been well-suited
to sophisticated treatments of the intersection of race, class, and
gender that proliferate in critical race feminism (Caldwell 1991;
2 These references to some exemplary readings of
Koh's work all engage, in one form
or another, his known area of expertise, international human rights law.
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Carbado 2000; Cho 1997; Crenshaw 1989, 1991; Harris 1990;
Hutchinson 1997)-excerpts from Munger's "Dependency by
Law: Welfare and Identity in the Lives of Poor Women" (pp.
243-54; Munger 2002). In it, Munger "describes how the stigma of
dependency and being identified as poor plays out in the lives of
women on welfare as well as how they react to and counter both"
(p. 243). Munger writes particularly about the ways in which welfare law reinforces social fault lines that separate poor black women
from others who share their economic needs and interests (pp.
249-50). One might astutely observe that Munger's analysis here
sounds like an intersectionality analysis. Given that critical race
feminists originated intersectionality theory and analysis in the
1980s, why is there not even a reference in the notes following the
Munger excerpt to those pathbreaking scholars (Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Patricia Williams, Angela Harris, Mari Matsuda, and Paulette
Caldwell among them) and their work?
About midway through the anthology, in the section "Lawyers
in Criminal Cases," Sarat excerpts Frohmann's "Convictability and
Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking" (pp. 284-91; Frohmann
1997). In it, Frohmann explores prosecutors' employment of "discordant locales"-the categorization of victims, defendants, jurors,
their places of residence, and the location of crime incidents-and
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in sexual assault cases.
Frohmann argues, for example, that cases of rape victims who live
in poor, minority neighborhoods (i.e., poor women of color) are
often unjustly dismissed or not pursued by prosecutors because of
juror bias against poor women of color as unworthy, unsympathetic, and even deserving victims (pp. 286-8).
The followings sections, 'Juries in Criminal Cases: Biased or
Conscientious Judgment" and "Sentencing," contain the book's
most explicit and focused discussions of race. In the former, Sarat
includes an essay written by history professor Elisabeth Perry that
appeared in The Chronicle of Higher Education on her jury duty
service and the great extent to which race and gender politics
played important roles in the jury's deliberations concerning a

black male murder defendant (pp. 330-3; Perry 2002). Presumably
in an attempt to present "balanced" views on this issue, Sarat follows up Perry's essay with an excerpt from an article coauthored by
Weiss and Zinsmeister, "When Race Trumps Truth in Court" (pp.
335-9; Weiss & Zinsmeister 1996). This article, which appeared in
a 1996 issue of The American Enterprise magazine (of which Zinsmeister is editor-in-chieo, attacks the notion of jury nullification,
which had then been recently resuscitated by critical race scholar
Paul Butler in a well-known and controversial essay in the Yale Law
Journal (Butler 1995).
HeinOnline -- 40 Law & Soc'y Rev. 487 2006
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Finally, in the "Sentencing" section, the Honorable Nancy
Gertner, a United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts, criticizes the 1984 Federal Sentencing Guidelines as, in
part, having an unjust and disparate impact on minority defendants (pp. 350-5; Gertner 2002). Also appearing in this section is an
excerpt from Spohn's "Thirty Years of Sentencing Reform: The
Quest for a Racially Neutral Sentencing Process," which suggests
that criminal sentencing remains racially discriminatory despite
attempts at "neutralizing" it. (pp. 365-80; Spohn 2002).
Sarat's inclusion of authors speaking on race such as Munger,
Frohmann, Perry, Gertner, Spohn, and even Weiss and Zinsmeister
is not problematic in and of itself. But the inclusion of these authors
at the exclusion of critical race scholars, who have been writing
extensively on these issues for 20 years now (Crenshaw et al. 1995;
Delgado 1995; Valdes et al. 2002), is obviously and extraordinarily
problematic. It is obviously problematic in light of the longstanding
critique of liberal legal scholarship first set forth by Delgado more
than 20 years ago in "The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature" (Delgado 1984). In it, Delgado
identifies the following liberal scholarly tradition:
It consists of white scholars' systematic occupation of, and exclusion of minority scholars from, the central areas of civil rights
scholarship. The mainstream writers tend to acknowledge only

each other's work. It is even possible that, consciously or not, they
resist entry by minority scholars into the field, perhaps counseling
them, as I was counseled, to establish their reputations in other
areas of the law (Delgado 1984:566).
Regrettably, Delgado's 20-year-old critique still resonates, rippling
out from the specific and original center of civil rights scholarship
toward broader and related scholarly fields such as those falling
under the tent of law and society. Critical race theory has outlived
critical legal studies. A large body of high-quality critical race
scholarship continues to develop. The editors of at least three anthologies have identified core and foundational readings in critical
race theory and critical race feminism (Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado 1995; Valdes et al. 2002), and many of the pieces collected
therein have been important not only to the development of
American jurisprudence more broadly but also to the development
of interdisciplinary approaches to the law. Critical race theory
courses are offered at a great number of law schools, and even
leading casebooks sometimes explore critical race interpretations
of doctrines such as contractual unconscionability (Knapp et al.
2003:571-2).
Thus, there is no lack of quality material that could have been
included in this edited volume. In fact, it would have been fairly
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easy to bridge the "schism between thought and action" by including critical race voices (assuming a desire to do so)-one need
only flip through the pages of existing anthologies to find works
that Sarat could and perhaps should have but did not include in
the book. For example, Crenshaw's classic article, "Mapping the
Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color" (Crenshaw 1991) is an ideal companion to Munger's piece on the impact of welfare laws on poor women (Munger
2002) in that it illuminates the complex intersectionality of race,
gender, and class lived by those very women. Roberts' "Punishing
Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the
Right of Privacy" (Roberts 1991) provides an insightful and important complement to Frohmann's piece on how race, gender,
and class impact prosecutorial discretion (Frohmann 1997). Johnson's "Black Innocence and the White Jury" (Johnson 1985)1
would have significantly strengthened the section on juries. And
finally, as to the Weiss and Zinsmeister critique ofjury nullification
(Weiss & Zinsmeister 1996), it seems only fair that parts of Butler's
Yale Law Journal essay (Butler 1995) should have been included in
addition to or perhaps in place of the Perry article from The
Chronicle (Perry 2002). And, in the first place, that Sarat chose to
include an ideologically ultra-conservative voice (a voice that also
appears quite infrequently in this reader) in a section so explicitly
about race without including a critical race response or analysis,
speaks volumes (perhaps inaccurately) about the priorities of the
law and society movement.

Conclusion: The Meaning of Exclusion of Voice
One might ask what the titles I just suggested (and they are
simply few of many) would add to the book. Do they simply restate
the existing points in more specific and perhaps compelling terms?
Do they provide insights not present in the selected pieces? They
do both and as such are valuable in and of themselves. But as it
stands, it is the work done by their exclusion that counts here, particularly given the intended student audience and the "race, class,
and gender" questions so often directed at them. For example, the
exclusion of critical race voices reifies the primacy of the "objective" majority scholar and observer who knows his (or in some
cases her) subjects and their problems better than their subjects
themselves do and, as a result, can best speak for them and on their
3 Much of the work ofJohnson, who is white, is considered part of the rich critical race
scholarship on the criminal justice system. Critical race theory, while developed mostly by
scholars of color, has and remains open to and inclusive of majority scholars engaged in
critical race inquiry.
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behalf. And, as a teacher who, like many of us, urges our students
to engage in critical reading and thinking in law school and undergraduate classrooms, it is deeply troubling that a text aimed at
students would fail to incorporate the critical voice.
Some might contend-as they did with Delgado 4-that the
critical race pieces I have referred to in this review (and those like
them) are simply not as "elegantly" written as those pieces that
were selected for inclusion. Similarly, it might be contended that
the pieces I have identified (and those like them) are overly academic and too theoretical for the reader's intended audience, and
that breadth of form of the included pieces was of great importance. It might even be contended that relevant critical race articles
were not included because they are not substantively rigorous and/
or analytically sound. But, having read the anthology through and,
over the years, an innumerable number of critical race law review
articles (including all of those that I referenced above), I would find
this last contention utterly incredible and the others about which I
have speculated quite unlikely. The inclusion of the above-mentioned critical race pieces (and those like them) would not only
have "added value" to the anthology because of the high quality
and originality of analysis reflected in them; their inclusion also
would have acted to counter the long-standing tradition of scholarly imperialism still so prevalent in the (legal) academy. Unfortunately, the omission of such work from the anthology-whether
intentional or not-has instead acted to perpetuate that tradition.
I am finally left to wonder whether critical race voices were
excluded from the reader simply because of lack of familiarity with
the body of scholarship, or because there was a desire not to convert this compilation into another critical race reader (given the
salience of race to the book's themes and topics), or because of the
4 In The Imperial Scholar, Delgado describes an exchange he had with a white male
colleague who had shown Delgado a draft of a paper he had been writing on equal personhood and that addressed, in part, the notion of "withered self-concepts" (Delgado
1984). Upon reading the draft, Delgado noted that on the issue of withered self-concepts,
his colleague had cited to Frank Michehman, who is white, for authority, and that none of
the draft's citations contained references to works of black and/or minority scholars (who
might know a thing or two about withered self-concepts). Delgado wrote,

I pointed out that although Frank Michelman may be a superb scholar and
teacher, he probably has relatively little first-hand knowledge about withered
self-concepts. I suggested that the professor add references to such works as
Kenneth Clark's Dark Ghetto and Grier and Cobb's Black Rage, and he
agreed to do so. To justify his selection of Frank Michelman for the proposition about withered self-concept, the author explained that Michelman's
statement was "so elegant."
Could inelegance of expression explain the absence of minority scholarship
from the text and footnotes of leading law review articles about civil rights?
(Delgado 1984:564-5).
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political and/or administrative machinations all editors of scholarly
compilations must deal with. Any or all of these motivations playing
some part in how the selections were made for this anthology
should, in my view, result in some serious self-inquiry and analysis
on the part of the law and society community, given how such
anthologies may, fairly or not, impact the reputation and direction
of their affiliated scholarly communities.
To be clear and specific, I am not suggesting that every member or affiliate of the community familiarize themselves with the
critical race theory canon-after all, one of the great strengths of
law and society is its range in interdisciplinary coverage. But given
how many race crits and fem race crits in fact do present their/our
work at the annual meetings, and given the great impact that critical race theory and feminism have had in and out of the law school
classroom, it seems almost unimaginable that introductory readings on law and society would not include examples of such scholarship.
I finally conclude with two last questions, again from the perspective of an outsider to the law and society movement. If this
reader represents a canon of introductory readings on law and
society, what messages are conveyed about law and society as a field
and community by the glaring absence of critical race voices in it?
And, more important, do you/we care?
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